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Following the phenomenon before the U.S. Supreme Court, 
many Christian advocacy groups and churches have increased 
their presence before the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). The advocacy groups can adopt a form of non-
governmental organizations (NGO), a conference of churches,1 or 
 
*    Dr. Hab. Eugenia Relaño Pastor, Senior Research Fellow, Department of Law & 
Anthropology, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle (Saale) Germany, 
pastor@eth.mpg.de. 
 1. See, e.g., Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 155, 183 (summarizing 
the arguments presented in the third-party intervener brief of the Catholic Bishops’ 
Conference of England and Wales); Martínez v. Spain, 2014-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 449, 474–75 
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even an appointed academic scholar as a representative of the 
church or as an independent neutral actor.2 As third-party 
interveners, these actors argue that to ensure more authentic and 
more legitimate judicial decision-making, additional voices beyond 
those of the parties should be heard by the court. The nature of 
intervention shifts from an invitation by the court to an application 
to the court; from official or statutory bodies such as governments3 
to lobbying groups;4 and from neutral submissions to “rather more 
partisan arguments.”5 
The so-called public interest intervention has been justified by 
scholars on two grounds: first, that intervention places a diversity 
of information, beyond that provided by the parties, before the 
court; and second, that intervention enhances the legitimacy of the 
eventual decision.6 Regarding the first point, we shall explore how 
much diverse information Christian advocacy groups effectively 
add to the cases for the ECtHR. As for legitimacy, the value of 
legitimation of the decision rendered by the court relies on the fair 
chance for different actors to “play the game.” As Bryden points 
out, “judicial decisions create winners and losers. And nobody likes 
to lose.”7 By enhancing opportunities for public participation and 
showing courts’ willingness to listen to interveners, judges attach 
importance to people. Bryden also argues that public participation 
is relevant “not only from the belief that we improve the accuracy 
of decisions when we allow people to present their side of the story, 
but also from our sense that participation is necessary to preserve 
human dignity and self-respect.”8 This argument will also be 
explored here by querying whether Christian advocacy groups’ 
interventions aim to protect human dignity by providing a voice 
 
(summarizing the arguments presented in the third-party intervener brief of the Spanish 
Episcopal Conference (Conferencia Episcopal Española)). 
 2. See, e.g., Oral Submission of Professor Joseph H.H. Weiler on Behalf of Armenia et 
al. as Third-Party Intervening States, Lautsi v. Italy, 2011-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 61, 
https://eclj.org/pdf/weiler_lautsi_third_parties_submission_by_jhh_weiler.pdf; Avidan 
Kent & Jamie Trinidad, International Law Scholars as Amici Curiae: An Emerging Dialogue (of the 
Deaf)?, 29 LEIDEN J. INT’L. L. 1081 (2016). 
 3. See, e.g., Lautsi, 2011-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 85–87 (discussing government  
interveners’ arguments). 
 4. See, e.g., Martínez, 2014-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 475 (discussing the European Centre for 
Law and Justice’s arguments). 
 5. Sarah Hannett, Third Party Intervention: In the Public Interest?, 2003 PUB. L. 128, 128. 
 6. Philip L. Bryden, Public Interest Intervention in the Court, 66 CAN. B. REV. 490 (1987). 
 7. Id. at 508. 
 8. Id. at 509. 
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for disadvantaged groups who have historically been ineffective in 
influencing public policy or, on the contrary, if their intervention 
contributes to judicial decision-making in one particular direction 
according to an overall campaign strategy for their own NGOs’ 
aims, which could be those of the large religious communities.  
The first Part of this Article shows how NGOs have become a 
driving force in shaping rights by intervening strategically in 
relevant litigation at the supranational level. The second Part aims 
at analyzing the meaning of the term amicus curiae as well as the 
progressive acceptance of NGOs as third-party interveners before 
the Strasbourg organs. And the third Part scrutinizes the four main 
“religious-oriented” areas in which Christian advocacy groups 
have intervened at the ECtHR. By analyzing the forty-four 
Strasbourg cases gathered from the Human Rights Documentation 
(HUDOC) database, as well as the main Christian advocacy groups’ 
internet sites, this contribution also hints at how Christian groups’ 
fundamental philosophical principles—with ramifications in 
sensitive ethical issues—could conflict with the evolving 
interpretation of the European Convention’s rights asserted by  
the Strasbourg Court. Furthermore, the study renders self-evident 
that these third-party actors endorse the governments’ arguments, 
and therefore the states’ margin of appreciation when their 
philosophical and religious principles that inspire their agendas  
are at stake.  
I. SUPRANATIONAL STRATEGIC LITIGATION: THE ROLE OF NGOS 
Supranational litigation opportunities offer interest groups as 
NGOs new participation rights and a voice at the supranational 
level and, more particularly, at the Council of Europe level. The role 
of NGOs in legal mobilization has received substantial attention 
among socio-legal scholars.9 Some literature has concentrated on 
 
 9. RACHEL A. CICHOWSKI, THE EUROPEAN COURT AND CIVIL SOCIETY: LITIGATION, 
MOBILIZATION AND GOVERNANCE (2007) [hereinafter CICHOWSKI, EUROPEAN COURT AND 
CIVIL SOCIETY]; Peter J. Spiro, Nongovernmental Organizations in International Relations 
(Theory), in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 223–43 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013); 
Rachel A. Cichowski, Legal Mobilization, Transnational Activism, and Gender Equality in the EU, 
28 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 209 (2013); Lisa Conant, Andreas Hofmann, Dagmar Soennecken & Lisa 
Vanhala, Mobilizing European Law, 25 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1376 (2017); Sophie Jacquot & 
Tommaso Vitale, Law as Weapon of the Weak? A Comparative Analysis of Legal Mobilization by 
Roma and Women’s Groups at the European Level, 21 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 587 (2014); Lisa Vanhala, 
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how unsuccessful groups, unable to exhaust the conventional 
political structures, can weaponize and instrumentalize the law as 
a strategic tool and provoke transformations of law or policy 
reforms from below.10 Other socio-legal scholars have adopted 
macro-level analyses of the political and legal opportunity 
structures (access to procedures in court) and cost-benefit 
calculations for NGO’s’ intervention.11 Another type of socio-legal 
research has centered on micro-level elements (organizations’ legal 
capacity or prior legal mobilization experience),12 and some other 
scholars, such as Anagnostou and Fokas, have analyzed the  
effect of the judicial rulings on the mobilization of social actors  
and how courts’ decisions can influence the discursive frames  
of social movements’ actors, reconstruct their interests, and at  
times empower them. As Anagnostou and Fokas highlight, 
courts—in a contradictory way in legal action related to religion 
and religious freedom—“can contribute to the emergence, growth 
or decline of social movements, not only of progressive but also  
of conservative ones.”13  
Regardless of the angle taken to study the role of NGOs in 
strategic litigation, Harlow and Rawlings draw a relevant 
distinction between proactive litigation strategies and reactive 
litigation strategies that is very useful for our analysis.14 Proactive 
litigation describes those situations where groups seek to take their 
cause to the courts and promote some policy change through 
courts. Reactive litigation would include those situations where 
 
Anti-Discrimination Policy Actors and Their Use of Litigation Strategies: The Influence of Identity 
Politics, 16 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 738, 740–45 (2009). 
 10. Jacquot & Vitale, supra note 9, at 587. 
 11. Conant et al., supra note 9, at 1382; HELEN DUFFY, STRATEGIC HUMAN RIGHTS 
LITIGATION: UNDERSTANDING AND MAXIMISING IMPACT 13–21 (2018). 
 12. See Muhip Ege Çağlıdil, When NGOs Turn to Strategic Litigation: European 
Supranational Courts as Venues to Influence EU Asylum Policy and the Dublin Regulations 
(2018) (M.A. thesis, Central European University), http://www.etd.ceu.edu/2018/ 
caglidil_muhip.pdf. 
 13. Dia Anagnostou & Effie Fokas, The “Radiating Effects” of the European Court of 
Human Rights on Social Mobilisations Around Religion in Europe—An Analytical Frame 7 
(Mobilise Grassroots, Working Paper No. 1, 2015), http://grassrootsmobilise.eu/the-
radiating-effects-of-the-european-court-of-human-rights-on-social-mobilisations-around-
religion-in-europe-an-analytical-frame/. 
 14. CAROL HARLOW & RICHARD RAWLINGS, PRESSURE THROUGH LAW (1992) (cited in 
Vanhala, supra note 9, at 741). 
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groups feel the law was discriminatory and challenge the law to 
seek a remedy and acknowledgment by the court.15 
At the supranational European level, judicial decisions can be 
used by NGOs as leverage to “expand the scope” of rights or “alter 
the meaning of treaty provisions—rules that are otherwise relatively 
immune to alteration.”16 The type of litigation heavily influences 
NGOs’ use of strategic litigation. In 1974, Galanter distinguished 
two types of litigation interventions: “repeat players” and “one-
shotters.”17 Repeat players have a broader experience by engaging 
simultaneously in several complaints, and they have more resources 
as well. Repeat player litigants are concerned not only about the 
outcome of a particular case but also about the change, or 
maintenance, of a specific policy. The very nature of “repeat 
playing” ensures an accumulation of experience and skills. Indeed, 
Hodson has argued that NGOs litigating before the ECtHR are 
mostly repeat players.18 Additionally, repeat players’ intervention 
does not always represent those who have traditionally had little 
effective voice in society. Indeed, in some jurisdictions, like Canada 
and the United Kingdom, strategic litigation also demonstrates that 
non-government interveners do not represent the sole interest of the 
powerless.19 For example, in the Pretty case in England, a terminally 
ill woman suffering from motor neuron disease sought judicial 
review of the Director of Public Prosecutions’s decision not to issue 
an undertaking not to prosecute her husband if he assisted her in 
killing herself.20 The House of Lords allowed interventions from 
representatives of the Catholic Church and a consortium of pro-life 
groups made up of the Society for the Protection of Unborn 
 
 15. A reactive litigation strategy is very important for sub-cultural movement 
organizations such as LGBT activism, which involves campaigning for the decriminalization 
of homosexual offenses and fighting against the unequal age of consent laws. Individual 
activists and small grassroots organizations relied on protest and subsequent “reactive 
litigation strategies” as a way of looking inward and developing and reproducing collective 
identities. See Vanhala, supra note 9, at 750. 
 16. CICHOWSKI, EUROPEAN COURT AND CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 9, at 6. 
 17. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97 (1974). Galanter points out that “[w]e might divide our actors 
into those claimants who have only occasional recourse to the courts (one-shotters or OS) 
and repeat players (RP) who are engaged in many similar litigations over time.” Id. 
 18. LOVEDAY HODSON, NGOS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE  
63–64 (2011). 
 19. Hannett, supra note 5, at 138. 
 20.  Pretty v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions [2001] UKHL 61, 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200102/ldjudgmt/jd011129/pretty-1.htm. 
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Children, the Medical Ethics Alliance, and Alert.21 In this case, the 
Christian third-party interveners gave voice to a majority sector of 
the population. 
Here, I will analyze the role of the Christian faith-based 
organizations as repeat players in their intervention at the ECtHR, 
and more specifically, the impact of their expertise in expanding 
case law and setting precedents for the Strasbourg Court. Churches 
and conferences of churches have also intervened as third parties; 
however, due to the limited space of this contribution, the 
intervention of churches will not be addressed.22 
II. AMICUS CURIAE BEFORE THE EUROPEAN COURT OF  
HUMAN RIGHTS 
A. Background: NGO Standing Before the ECtHR 
There is no single valid definition of NGO.23 NGOs are 
distinguished from other common types of organizations, 
specifically governmental bodies, enterprises, and informal 
 entities such as families.24 For this Article, the term will be used  
to describe a type of non-state actor that is formally constituted  
and non-profit seeking. 
When the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
entered into force on September 3, 1953, and the 1950 original 
version was read, individuals and private groups, including NGOs, 
did not have the right to appear before the ECtHR.25 However, 
individuals and groups, including NGOs, could file complaints 
with the European Commission of Human Rights, claiming a 
violation by one of the member states of his, her, or its rights as set 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Churches have played a prominent role as third-party interveners in relevant 
ECtHR cases. See Schüth v. Germany, 2010-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 397, 422 (summarizing the 
Catholic Diocese of Essen’s arguments as third-party intervener); Sindicatul “Păstorul cel 
Bun” v. Romania, 2013-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, 59–60 (summarizing the arguments of third-party 
interveners, the Archdiocese of Craiova and the Moscow Patriarchate). 
 23. See Stephan Hobe, Non-Governmental Organizations, in MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Anne Peters & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2019), 
https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e968?rskey=ICvYvG&result=3&prd=MPIL. 
 24. Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, NGO Standing and Influence in Regional Human Rights Courts 
and Commissions, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 911, 911 (2011). 
 25. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
art. 25, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
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forth in the European Convention. Over time, the President of the 
ECtHR could grant the opportunity to intervene to both individuals 
and NGOs if, in a given case, it would be in the interest of the 
proper administration of justice. Before 1998, it appears NGOs 
participated in only several dozen cases in total.26 When Protocol 
11 went into effect in 1998, it eliminated the European Commission 
and expanded the entities that had a right to bring a case before the 
ECtHR. More specifically, Protocol 11 amended Article 34 of the 
European Convention to provide that “[t]he Court may receive 
applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or 
group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one 
of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the 
Convention or the protocols thereto.”27 Protocol 11 also amended 
Article 36 of the ECHR that under the heading Third-party 
intervention to state, “The President of the Court may, in the interest 
of the proper administration of justice, invite any High Contracting 
Party which is not a party to the proceedings or any person 
concerned who is not the applicant to submit written comments or 
take part in hearings.”28 
Nevertheless, the right for an NGO to act as a claimant before 
the ECtHR has been restricted. The NGO must have a claim that it 
has been the victim of a violation by a member state of the rights 
set forth in the European Convention, and it is not sufficient  
that the rights of the group of individuals which the NGO 
represents have been violated. Consequently, as Laura Van den 
Eynde points out, since NGOs do not have locus standi before the 
ECtHR to act on behalf of alleged victims within their field  
of competence, third-party interventions have effectively become 
one of the few available avenues for NGOs to become involved  
in cases before the Court.29 
B. Third-Party Intervention and Amicus Curiae Briefs 
The literal translation of the Latin term amicus curiae as “a friend 
of the court” often causes confusion as to its present nature, scope, 
 
 26. Mayer, supra note 24, at 916. 
 27. Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 34, May 11, 1994, C.E.T.S. No. 155. 
 28. Id. art. 36. 
 29. Laura Van den Eynde, An Empirical Look at the Amicus Curiae Practice of Human 
Rights NGOs Before the European Court of Human Rights, 31 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 271, 276 (2013). 
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and origins.30 In 1964, Ernest Angell provided a definition by which 
amicus appears “to have been originally a bystander who, without 
any direct interest in the litigation, intervened on his own initiative 
to make a suggestion to the court on matters of fact and law within 
his own knowledge: the death of a party, manifest error, collusion, 
etc.”31 From this definition can be drawn that the amicus assists the 
court on the law and on the facts. As a non-party intervener 
“without having an interest in the cause,”32 independence and 
neutrality are assumed. The assistance provided to the court relies 
on the amicus’s expertise and the ability to assist the court with 
research, arguments, and submissions. An amicus can even correct 
the court when a judge is doubtful or mistaken.33 Chandra Mohan 
classifies the amicus curiae into four categories for a better 
understanding of its historical development:  
1. The Classic or Traditional Amicus: The amicus is normally 
appointed if the court considers that a case involves 
important questions of law of public interest. The 
purpose of the amicus is to advise or assist the court in 
arriving at its decision and not to represent the interests 
of any party or cause. 
2. The Bystander or Intervening Good Samaritan: The amicus 
is as a bystander-intervener that offers factual or legal 
information to the court.  
3. The Supportive Amicus: This category can be subdivided 
into three categories: (a) the amicus appointed by the 
court to present the case on behalf of an undefended 
party; (b) the amicus as a third party with a “personal 
and direct interest in one of the parties in the case”;34 
and (c) government officers permitted to appear as 
amicus on behalf of a wider public interest to inform the 
court about public policy issues.  
 
 30. See S. Chandra Mohan, The Amicus Curiae: Friends No More?, 2010 SING. J. LEGAL 
STUD. 352, 353, 357. 
 31. Ernest Angell, The Amicus Curiae American Development of English Institutions, 16 
INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 1017, 1017 (1967). 
 32. See Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE 
L.J. 694, 694 (1963) (quoting 1 BENJ. VAUGHAN ABBOTT, DICTIONARY OF TERMS AND PHRASES 
USED IN AMERICAN OR ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 62 (1879)). 
 33. Kent & Trinidad, supra note 2, at 1084. 
 34. Mohan, supra note 30, at 369. 
1337 Christian Faith-Based Organizations 
 1337 
4. The Political or Modern Amicus: The amicus often has a 
strong interest in the outcome and represents an interest 
group or organization with a social or political agenda.35  
Considering this classification, Chandra Mohan raises a pertinent 
question: Is the amicus a friend of the court or to the court? This 
question goes beyond semantics. A friend of the court assists by 
providing information so that the court will not fall into error, and 
a friend to the court attempts to persuade the court to adopt a 
particular point of view or the outcome.36 
As previously noted, NGOs can be involved in cases before the 
ECtHR as third-party interveners. This possibility appeared on 
January 1, 1983, when the Revised Rules of Court came into force 
and Rule 37(2) stated that:  
The President may, in the interest of the proper administration of 
justice, invite or grant leave to any Contracting State which is not 
a Party to the proceedings to submit written comments within a 
time-limit and on issues which he shall specify. He may extend 
such an invitation or grant such leave to any person concerned 
other than the applicant.37 
The first successful intervention of a third party under this Rule 
was made by the Post Office Engineering Union with the help of an 
NGO, namely INTERIGHTS, in Malone v. United Kingdom.38 
INTERIGHTS, jointly with the British NGO ARTICLE 19, also 
unsuccessfully intervened in Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria,39 a 
case challenging the Austrian blasphemy law, and offered support 
to the European Commission to consider the necessity of laws that 
ban expression which ridiculed or was offensive to a particular 
religion or religious belief.40 In Otto-Preminger, the third-party 
intervention was supported by declarations from nine freedom of 
 
 35. Id. at 365–72. 
 36. Id. at 369. 
 37. Revised Rules of Court, Eur. Ct. H.R., R. 37(2) (Nov. 24, 1982), 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Library_1982_RoC_Revised_Nouveau_BIL.PDF. 
 38. Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14, 16 (1985). 
 39. Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, App. No. 13470/87, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep.  
34, 37 (1994). 
 40. See generally id. 
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expression professors and lawyers of ten European countries and 
the United States.41 
Today, the European Court has a well-established and 
important system for intervention in cases by third parties 
regulated by Article 36 of ECHR and Article 44 of the Rules of the 
Court.42 According to Rule 44 section 3(a): 
[T]he President of the Chamber may, in the interests of the proper 
administration of justice, as provided in Article 36 § 2 of the 
Convention, invite, or grant leave to, any Contracting Party which 
is not a party to the proceedings, or any person concerned who is 
not the applicant, to submit written comments or, in exceptional 
cases, to take part in a hearing.43  
Further, “the President may decide not to include the comments in 
the case file or to limit participation in the hearing to the extent that 
he or she considers appropriate.”44 A third party can also seek to 
provide written comments that “shall be forwarded by the 
Registrar to the parties to the case, who shall be entitled, subject to 
any conditions, including time-limits, set by the President of the 
Chamber, to file written observations in reply or, where 
appropriate, to reply at the hearing.”45 All the provisions under 
Rule 44 apply as well to the proceedings before the Grand Chamber 
constituted to deliver advisory opinions under Article 2 of Protocol 
 
 41. Marek Antoni Nowicki, NGOs Before the European Commission and the Court of 
Human Rights, 14 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 289, 298 (1996). 
 42. Rule 44 was amended by the Court on July 7, 2003; November 13, 2006; and 
September 19, 2016. Revised Rules of Court, Eur. Ct. H.R., R. 44 n.2 (Jan. 1, 2020), 
https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/rules_court_eng.pdf. 
 43. Id. § 3(a); see also id. § 3(b) (“Requests for leave for this purpose must be duly 
reasoned and submitted in writing in one of the official languages as provided in Rule 34 § 4 
not later than twelve weeks after notice of the application has been given to the respondent 
Contracting Party. Another time-limit may be fixed by the President of the Chamber for 
exceptional reasons.”). 
 44. Id. § 5. It is interesting to note that 
[i]n cases to be considered by the Grand Chamber, the periods of time . . . shall run 
from the notification to the parties of the decision of the Chamber under Rule 72 
§ 1 to relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber or of the decision of 
the panel of the Grand Chamber under Rule 73 § 2 to accept a request by a party 
for referral of the case to the Grand Chamber. 
Id. § 4(a). According to Rule 44 section 4(b), “[t]he time-limits laid down in this Rule may 
exceptionally be extended by the President of the Chamber if sufficient cause is shown.”  
Id. § 4(b). 
 45. Id. § 6. 
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No. 16 to the Convention.46 In this latter case, the President of the 
Court has the power to determine the time limits which apply to 
third-party interveners. 
C. Methodology: Data Collection 
The amicus briefs submitted to the court have increased since 
Protocol 11 came into effect in 1998.47 However, it is difficult to 
access the number and the content of the third-party interventions 
because they are not listed in any open and comprehensive 
database. The only online database that identifies participation by 
organization type and modes of participation (direct victim, legal 
representative, and amicus/third-party intervention) is the 
European Court of Human Rights Database (ECHRdb) run by 
Cichowski and Chrun.48 It is not an open database, although some 
key information can be found in the opening remarks on the 
ECHRdb internet site: from 1960 until 2014, a total of 15,147 
judgments have been delivered and 1,233 amicus briefs have been 
filed.49 Therefore, this Article only uses the data extracted from the 
HUDOC database (decisions as well as judgments). Unfortunately, 
HUDOC does not list in any way the third-party interventions. 
Consequently, the way to proceed has been twofold: first, to search 
for the keywords in Article 36(2)—the current article allowing 
third-party interventions—and Article 37(2)—the article related to 
third-party interventions before the entry in force of Protocol 11; 
and second, from the results thus obtained, to search for the most 
well-known Christian advocacy groups as keywords (like the 
European Centre for Law and Justice, ADF International, Alliance 
Defending, and Movimento per la Vita).  
However, using only the HUDOC database is precarious due to 
the deficiency in the advance search engine provided that reveals 
notable imperfections: (1) sometimes the court mentions amici and 
 
 46. See Protocol No. 16 to the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Oct. 2, 2013, C.E.T.S. No. 214. 
 47. For an illustration of the increase of amicus participation in the court, see Van den 
Eynde, supra note 29, at 280. 
 48. Rachel Cichowski & Elizabeth Chrun, EUR. CT. OF HUM. RTS. DATABASE, 
https://depts.washington.edu/echrdb/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2021). 
 49. Id. The ECHRdb supposes to make available a set of downloadable data files and 
an online analysis tool enabling broad access to the data. However, the ECHRdb Online 
Analysis Tool has not yet been implemented at the time of writing, and the access to the 
datasets was not possible through the mail contact provided. See id. 
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other times “third-party intervener” without specifying who; 
(2) occasionally the court does not even mention the participation 
of amici; and (3) there is no access to the original written briefs 
submitted by the third parties. To complete the information  
about potential amici submitted by the advocacy groups  
mentioned above, the internet sites of these groups have been 
scrutinized, although only some written submissions presented 
before the ECtHR are accessible on their websites. Hence,  
because the information comes from diverse sources and is not 
systematized, the analysis of the interventions of these NGOs  
as third parties is incomplete.50 
III. CHRISTIAN ADVOCACY GROUPS AS AMICUS CURIAE AND THEIR 
IMPACT ON THE STRASBOURG COURT 
A. Who Are the Most Prominent Christian  
NGOs Active Before the Court? 
As Van den Eynde notes, the appearance of Christian groups 
labeled as “conservative” in the Strasbourg Court is an echo of the 
phenomenon observed before the U.S. Supreme Court for at least 
three decades.51 The adjective “conservative” speaks for socially 
conservative Christian advocacy groups—mainly Catholics and 
Evangelicals—who have been actively mobilized in litigation in the 
United States in abortion decisions, right-to-die cases, and issues of 
religion and education since the 1970s.52 Indeed, United States and 
Canada provide the best-developed examples of NGO involvement 
in religious litigation and in litigation specifically by religious 
groups.53 The study of mobilizations around religion is not 
surprising given the fact, as Fokas notices, that religion plays a 
more prominent public and political role in North America than in 
 
 50. Sometimes the advocacy organization represents the applicant so is not listed as a 
third-party intervener. See the intervention of ADF International in Dimitrova v. Bulgaria, 
ADF INT’L, https://adfinternational.org/legal/dimitrova-v-bulgaria/ (last visited Mar. 16, 
2021); Vitaliy Bak v. Russia, ADF INT’L, https://adfinternational.org/legal/vitaliy-bak-v-
russia/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2021); and Altınkaynak v. Turkey, ADF INT’L, https:// 
adfinternational.org/legal/altinkaynak-and-others-v-turkey/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2021). 
 51. Van den Eynde, supra note 29, at 287. 
 52. Dennis R. Hoover & Kevin R. den Dulk, Christian Conservatives Go to Court: Religion 
and Legal Mobilization in the United States and Canada, 25 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 9, 11 (2004). 
 53. See generally Bryden, supra note 6; Hannett, supra note 5; Hoover & den Dulk, 
supra note 52, at 21–26. 
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the European context.54 Due to the experience of the U.S. Christian 
advocacy groups in litigation and the fact that Evangelical 
Christians tend to work transnationally more than other 
stakeholder groups, the two most influential Christian advocacy 
groups at the Strasbourg organs are the European Centre for Law 
and Justice (ECLJ) and the Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF, also 
known as ADF International, and formerly known as Alliance 
Defense Fund). Both are originally from the United States. 
ADF defines itself “[l]ike the Body of Christ, . . . [a] body made 
up of many parts[,]” and for more than 25 years it has been 
advocating “for religious liberty, the sanctity of human life, 
freedom of speech, and marriage and family.”55 Founded in 1993 
by thirty-five Christian leaders who “came together to build a 
ministry that “would defend your religious freedom— . . . before it 
was too late[,]”56 the founders knew that “it would take an  
alliance to keep the doors open for the Gospel in the United 
States.”57 One of its main goals is advocacy with an impact  
on society. ADF’s website explains, “It is not enough to just win 
cases; we must change the culture[.]”58 The transplantation of ADF 
to Europe results in a branch of the original U.S. matrix under the 
name of ADF International, and it characterizes itself as a “faith-
based legal advocacy organization that protects fundamental 
freedoms and promotes the inherent dignity of all people.”59  
As an advocacy group, it advocates for the sanctity of life, marriage 
and family, and religious freedom by “[m]aking a far-reaching  
and lasting impact[.]”60 
ECLJ defines itself as “an international, Non-Governmental 
Organization dedicated to the promotion and protection of human 
 
 54. Effie Fokas, Comparative Susceptibility and Differential Effects on the Two European 
Courts: A Study of Grasstops Mobilizations Around Religion, 5 OXFORD J.L. & RELIGION 541, 545 
(2016). As Dennis R. Hoover and Kevin R. den Dulk note: “American political culture is 
exceptionally litigious and exceptionally religious.” Hoover & den Dulk, supra note 52, at 10. 
 55. About Us, ALL. DEFENDING FREEDOM, https://www.adflegal.org/about-us (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2021). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Who We Are, ADF INT’L, https://adfinternational.org/who-we-are/ (last visited 
Mar. 16, 2021). 
 60. Advocacy, ADF INT’L, https://adfinternational.org/advocacy/ (last visited  
Mar. 19, 2021). 
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rights in Europe and worldwide.”61 ECLJ is the European arm of 
the American Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ),62 and it advocates 
in particular for the protection of religious freedoms and the 
dignity of the person at the ECtHR. ECLJ also “bases its action on 
‘the spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage of 
European peoples and the true source of individual freedom, 
political liberty and the rule of law, principles which form the basis 
of all genuine democracy[.]’”63 
Both transnational Christian faith organizations have been 
active in litigation beyond the domain of religious freedom and 
have extended the agenda to topics that concern core issues for the 
most conservative Christian groups such as same-sex civil 
partnerships, same-sex marriages, bioethics, LGBT rights, religious 
feelings and freedom of expression, the autonomy of the religious 
groups, euthanasia, embryo screening, etc.64 
The third Christian NGO active as a third-party intervener 
before the ECtHR is Movimento per la Vita Italiano (the Italian Pro-
Life Movement, or MPVI). The organization is not a transnational 
NGO but an Italian association that brings together in a single 
federation more than five hundred local pro-life movements, 
centers, and services existing in Italy.65 The MPVI has the aim of 
defending and promoting the value of human life “from conception 
to natural death” and the recognition of every human being as the 
holder of the inalienable right to life.66 Although Christianity is not 
mentioned on the MPVI internet site, the Movimento per la Vita is an 
association of the Catholic Church that aims to promote social 
goals, and it is quite well spread across Italy.67 No information can 
 
 61. EUR. CTR. FOR L. & JUST., https://eclj.org/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2021). 
 62. American Center for Law and Justice is a not-for-profit, religious corporation 
“specifically dedicated to the ideal that religious freedom and freedom of speech are 
inalienable, God-given rights . . . The organization has participated in numerous cases before 
the Supreme Court[.]” AM. CTR. FOR L. & JUST., http://aclj.org/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2021). 
 63. EUR. CTR. FOR L. & JUST., supra note 61. 
 64. For legal mobilization in courts, Hoover and den Dulk grouped two religious 
traditions (evangelical Protestantism and Roman Catholicism) under the single rubric of 
“Christian conservatives” because “both traditions have staked out socially conservative 
positions on abortion and the right to die and on religion and education.” Hoover & den 
Dulk, supra note 52, at 22. 
 65. Chi Siamo, MOVIMENTO PER LA VITA, http://www.mpv.org/il-movimento-per-la-
vita-italiano/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2021). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Catholic, SAPERE.IT, https://www.sapere.it/enciclopedia/catt%C3%B2lico.html 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2021). 
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be found on MPVI’s internet site about its role before the ECtHR. 
According to the HUDOC database, MPVI has intervened as 
amicus curiae in two seminal cases: Costa & Pavan v. Italy68 and 
Parrillo v. Italy.69 
The research conducted in the online database HUDOC shows 
that ADF International has intervened as a third party in fourteen 
ECtHR decisions or judgments and an additional four decisions 
under its American counterpart, ADF. ADF International and 
Alliance Defending Freedom have both concurred in fourteen cases 
together, and ADF International has intervened by itself in A. v. 
Switzerland,70 Y.T. v. Bulgaria,71 A.A. v. Switzerland,72 and Wunderlich 
v. Germany.73 It is difficult to understand the motivation to 
intervene via both NGOs jointly in some cases while opting for 
single interventions in other cases. 
Regarding ECLJ, it has intervened as a third party twenty-four 
times according to the HUDOC database (see, for example, W.K. v. 
Sweden).74 Unfortunately, the data retrieved from the HUDOC 
database is incomplete. For example, according to the ECLJ internet 
site, this NGO has submitted some written submissions in B.B v. 
Poland,75 Cassar v. Malta,76 and Teliatnikov v. Lithuania,77 but the 
ECtHR does not refer to such participation. 
Considering the inadequacy of the HUDOC database to 
provide a comprehensive view of the actors intervening as amici 
curiae, as well as the insufficiency of the data supplied by the above 
 
 68. Costa v. Italy, App. No. 54270/10, ¶ 6 (Aug. 28, 2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=001-112993. 
 69. Parrillo v. Italy, 2015-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 249, 258. 
 70. A. v. Switzerland, App. No. 60342/16 (Dec. 19, 2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=001-179573. 
 71. Y.T. v. Bulgaria, App. No. 41701/16 (July 9, 2020), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=001-203898. 
 72. A.A. v. Switzerland, App. No. 58802/12 (Jan. 7, 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=001-139903. 
 73. Wunderlich v. Germany, App. No. 18925/15 (Jan. 10, 2019), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188994. 
 74. W.K. v. Sweden, App. No. 36802/15 (May 23, 2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=001-174797. 
   75. B.B. v. Poland, App. No. 67171/17 (Feb. 17, 2020), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=001-201485. 
 76. Cassar v. Malta, App. No. 36982/11 (July 9, 2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=001-123392. 
 77. Teliatnikov v. Lithuania, App. No. 51914/19 (June 8, 2020), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-202965. 
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NGOs’ internet sites as third-party interveners, this Article relies on 
the analysis of the forty-four cases gathered (see Appendix) to 
examine the patterns of the mentioned Christian advocacy groups’ 
participation as third parties across time and topics at the ECtHR. 
Knowing that Alliance Defending Freedom and ADF International 
are interconnected in their roots, the following table shows that the 
most repeat player at the Strasbourg Court is ECLJ. It is noteworthy 
to underscore that ECLJ and ADF (and ADF International) often 
join forces together. 
Third-Party Interventions Cases Percentage 
European Centre for Law and Justice 18 40.9% 
ADF International, Alliance Defending Freedom 8 18.2% 
Alliance Defending Freedom, European Centre 
for Law and Justice 5 11.4% 
ADF International 4 9.1% 
Alliance Defending Freedom 4 9.1% 
European Centre for Law and Justice, Movimento 
per la Vita 2 4.5% 
ADF International, European Centre for Law 
and Justice 1 2.3% 
Alliance Defending, European Centre for Law 
and Justice 1 2.3% 
ADF International, Alliance Defending 
Freedom, European Centre for Law and Justice 1 2.3% 
Total 44  
Table 1: Third-Party Interventions by Actors Involved 
1. The substantive areas of concern as third-party interveners 
For clarity, the forty-four cases have been classified according 
to four main topics that are “religious-oriented” or include a 
religious factor: (1) family and private life (abortion, procreation 
technologies, gender identity, and same-sex couples), (2) autonomy 
of religious groups and individual religious freedom, (3) freedom 
of expression, and (4) religion-based refugee claims. These four 
categories touch a variety of articles of the ECHR, and the list of 
cases analyzed here fall mainly on the following articles of the 
Convention: Article 2 (right to life), Article 3 (prohibition on torture 
or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), Article 8 
(right to respect for private and family life), Article 9 (freedom of 
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religion or belief), Article 10 (freedom of expression),78 and Article 
2 of Protocol No. 1 (right to education).79 It is beyond the scope of 
this Article to consider in detail the trends and ambivalences of the 
Strasbourg Court case law on each of the mentioned articles. What 
this contribution will seek to do, however, is to first consider the 
impact of intervention, either in the determination of facts of the 
case or in the legal approach to the question at stake, and once 
determined, to analyze the influence of the written submission by 
the third parties in the outcome of the cases. 
2. Family and private life 
The greatest number of the Christian advocacy groups’ 
interventions (twenty-one out of the forty-four cases) have been 
proposed under the umbrella of private life and family life cases, 
and they deal almost exclusively with Article 8 of the ECHR. This 
Article encompasses four concepts that have been given 
autonomous meaning by the Strasbourg organs: “private life, 
family life, home, and correspondence[.]”80 As regards “family life” 
and “private life,” the ECtHR has extended the scope of Article 8 
by incorporating social, legal, and technological developments, and 
it is difficult to provide definitions for both terms. Indeed, “private 
life” has been described by the ECtHR as “not susceptible to 
exhaustive definition[,]”81 and therefore, it is not surprising that 
new rights are born out of the right of respect for private life.82 In 
Pretty v. United Kingdom, the court gave an overview of the meaning 
of “private life” as an area that “covers the physical and 
psychological integrity of a person . . . [that will] sometimes 
embrace aspects of an individual’s physical and social identity[.]”83 
Such elements as, for example, gender identification, name, sexual 
orientation, and sexual life, fall within the personal sphere 
 
 78.  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
supra note 25. 
 79.  Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 2, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262. 
 80. Maris Burbergs, How the Right to Respect for Private and Family Life, Home and 
Correspondence Became the Nursery in Which New Rights Are Born, in SHAPING RIGHTS IN THE 
ECHR: THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 315, 322 (Eva Brems & Janneke Gerards eds., 2013). 
 81. Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, App. No. 13134/87, ¶ 36 (Mar. 25, 1993), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57804. 
 82. Burbergs, supra note 80, at 323. 
  83. Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 155, 193. 
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protected by Article 8. Article 8 also protects a right to personal 
development, and the right to establish and develop relationships 
with other human beings and the outside world. Although no 
previous case has established the right to self-determination 
contained in Article 8 of the Convention, the court will consider that 
the notion of personal autonomy is an important principle 
underlying the interpretation of its guarantees.84 The Strasbourg 
Court’s approach to the notion of personal autonomy conflicts 
bluntly with the notion of human rights that Christian advocacy 
groups support. To these groups, human rights are not arbitrarily 
defined according to the will of an individual concerning each 
subject. As ECLJ has particularly noted in the written observations 
submitted in Cassar v. Malta:  
[I]t is necessary to preserve even the philosophy of the 
Convention, as it is from its philosophy that its authority is 
derived. . . . Subjectivism relative to individualism, by rejecting 
the reference to the nature of man, leads to the destruction of the 
basis and philosophy of human rights.85  
The contrast in understanding between the philosophy beyond the 
ECHR for the Christian third parties and the Strasbourg Court is 
noticeable. For the latter, ECHR rights and freedom should be 
interpreted in the light of contemporary practice, and it would be 
futile to argue that ECHR should primarily be interpreted in 
accordance with the original intent of the drafters. For example, 
from the late 1980s, the court read Article 2 in a context of a 
contemporary rejection of the death penalty,86 while for some 
Christian groups such as ECLJ, “the universality of human rights 
presupposes and requires a universal concept of man” and the 
universality of rights (i.e., the right to marry) requires universal 
concepts (i.e., concept of marriage).87  
a. Marriage, transgender marriage, and same-sex marriage. 
Likewise, ECLJ underlined in the written observations in Cassar v. 
 
 84. See, e.g., id. (“[T]he Court considers that the notion of personal autonomy is an 
important principle underlying the interpretation of [Article 8’s] guarantees.”) 
 85. Written Observations for Eur. Ctr. for L. & Just. as Third-Party Intervener at 9, 
Cassar v. Malta, App. No. 36982/11 (July 9, 2013) [hereinafter Written Observations for ECLJ 
in Cassar], https://7676076fde29cb34e26d-759f611b127203e9f2a0021aa1b7da05.ssl.cf2. 
rackcdn.com/eclj/echr-cassar-v-malta-eclj-observations-en.pdf. 
 86. See Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (1989). 
 87. Written Observations for ECLJ in Cassar, supra note 85, at 16. 
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Malta the content of the right to marriage. According to the ECLJ’s 
philosophy, the right to marriage has been considered not as an 
individual right that belongs to a person, but a right that belongs to 
the couple. Additionally, the content of the right to marry is not 
determined by its subject—it is precisely defined by society. 
Therefore, Article 12 of the ECHR enshrines a reciprocal 
commitment between the couple and society, where the right to 
marry involves three players (the man, the woman, and society), 
with a common interest (the family). This approach is well reflected 
in the case Orlandi v. Italy, a seminal case about the right to marriage 
for same-sex couples.88 In Orlandi, ECLJ joined forces with Alliance 
Defending Freedom. The latter provided to the Strasbourg Court 
information about heterosexual marriage in the European context. 
ADF insisted that there is a European consensus on recognizing 
marriage exclusively between a man and a woman. The ELCJ 
provided to the court detailed information about marriage 
registration and the scope of the notion of public order. 
Surprisingly, the Orlandi Strasbourg judgment only partly 
reproduces the written observations submitted by ECLJ.89 Despite 
the fact that the submitted written observations are long and 
founded in comparative law and case law analysis, the ECtHR 
addressed them both very briefly and refuted the arguments of 
public order90 and the lack of legal recognition of same-sex couples 
in a superficial manner.91 The court found a violation of Article 8 
since the State (Italy) failed to ensure that the applicants had 
available a specific legal framework providing for the recognition 
 
 88. Orlandi v. Italy, App. Nos. 26431/12, 26742/12, 44057/12 & 60088/12 (Dec. 14, 
2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-179547. 
 89. Written Observations for Eur. Ctr. for L. & Just. as Third-Party Intervener, Orlandi, 
App. Nos. 26431/12, 26742/12, 44057/12 & 60088/12 [hereinafter Written Observations for 
ECLJ in Orlandi], https://7676076fde29cb34e26d-759f611b127203e9f2a0021aa1b7da05.ssl. 
cf2.rackcdn.com/eclj/Oliari-Orlandi-v-Italy-ECHR-ECLJ-WO-English.pdf. 
 90. Unlike other provisions of the Convention, Article 8 did not list “the notion of 
‘public order’ as one of the legitimate aims in the interests of which a State m[ight]  
interfere with an individual’s rights.” Orlandi, App. Nos. 26431/12, 26742/12, 44057/12 & 
60088/12, ¶ 200. 
 91. “[T]o date[,] . . . twenty-seven countries out of the forty-seven [Council of Europe] 
member states h[ad] . . . enacted legislation permitting same-sex couples to have their 
relationship recognised . . . .” Id. ¶ 112. The same could not be said about registration of 
same-sex marriages. Id. ¶ 113. 
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and protection of their same-sex unions.92 Although the third-party 
submissions meticulously analyzed the legal arguments and 
comparative law, NGOs’ interventions did not have an impact on 
the legal reasoning in the outcome of the Orlandi case. In this latter 
case, ECLJ reiterated the argument against the interpretation of the 
Convention in light of the circumstances and noted that: 
[T]hese circumstances only provide guidance and cannot be 
substituted in place of the Convention as the principal point of 
reference. Otherwise, the mission of the Court would be 
transformed, particularly regarding social issues, into an 
instrument of the ideological updating of national legislation. 
This path would lead far beyond its jurisdiction.93 
b. Assisted reproductive technologies (ART) and gender 
reassignment. This category comprises several cases in which the 
Strasbourg Court connects ARTs with family and private life. In the 
case of S.H. v. Austria,94 the court clarified that the right of a couple 
to use ARTs to conceive a child falls under the scope of Article 8. 
The right to respect for private and family life was further 
expanded in Costa v. Italy, where the court held that it covers “the 
applicants’ desire to conceive a child unaffected by the genetic 
disease of which they are healthy carriers and to use ART and [pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis] to this end[.]”95 Similar to other 
cases like Orlandi v. Italy, the ECtHR referred only briefly to the 
arguments submitted by the amici curiae. For example, in Costa v. 
Italy, it is worthy to note that if the content of the amici’s submission 
does not add any new element to the argumentation advanced by 
the government, the court uses sentences like “[t]he first third-party 
intervener reiterated the observations of the respondent 
Government[,]”96 which renders it difficult to know if the court has 
taken into consideration the scientific explanations about ARTs 
submitted by the third parties. Regardless of the disagreements 
 
 92. In Schalk v. Austria, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 409, 429, the court stated that Article 12 
cannot “in all circumstances be limited to marriage between two persons of the opposite 
sex . . . [But] whether or not to allow same-sex marriage is left to regulation by the national 
law of the Contracting State.” See also JENS M. SCHERPE, THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF 
EUROPEAN FAMILY LAW 24–27 (2016); SHAZIA CHOUDHRY & JONATHAN HERRING, EUROPEAN 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND FAMILY LAW 148–51, 167–69 (2010). 
 93. Written Observations for ECLJ in Orlandi, supra note 89, at 6. 
 94. S.H. v. Austria, 2011-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 295, 318. 
 95. Costa v. Italy, App. No. 54270/10, ¶ 57 (Aug. 28, 2012), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-112993. 
 96. Id. ¶ 50. 
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among the third parties and the ECtHR about whether ARTs 
should fall under Article 8, the court agreed with the third party 
that there was not a positive obligation on the member states for 
medically assisted procreation techniques.97 More specifically, the 
Grand Chamber held in S.H. v. Austria that the absolute ban on ova 
donation and sperm donation for in vitro fertilization did not 
exceed the states’ margin of appreciation.98 
Another emblematic case in terms of the high number of 
observations submitted by the third-party interveners is Parrillo v. 
Italy.99 This case reached the Grand Chamber and touches core 
issues for Christian advocacy groups: the right to life, the right over 
embryos as a property right, human dignity, the ontological 
conception of human rights, and states’ margin of appreciation. 
ECLJ and MPVI were authorized to submit an amicus brief. Since 
the full text of the written submissions is not available in the 
HUDOC database, we only have access to the submissions 
presented by ECLJ through its internet site. No information has 
been found regarding the Movimento per la Vita’s brief in Parrillo. 
According to the text of the judgment, the arguments put through 
by Movimento per la Vita were scarce and quite redundant.100 Both 
advocacy groups insisted that in vitro embryos in a state of 
cryopreservation should benefit from the protection of the 
measures of Italian law that forbid the destruction of human 
embryos. Additionally, they noted that since embryos are subjects, 
“they cannot be things or objects of a right in rem, and cannot be 
deliberately destroyed.”101 The ECtHR observed in Parrillo that, 
according to its case law, the concept of “private life” within the 
meaning of Article 8 of the Convention is a broad one, not 
susceptible to an exhaustive definition, and embraces, among other 
things, a right to self-determination. The concept also incorporates 
the right to respect for both the decisions to become and not to 
become a parent. Regarding the particular question of the fate of 
 
 97. S.H., 2011-V Eur. Ct. H.R., at 316–17. 
 98. See ALICE MARGARIA, THE CONSTRUCTION OF FATHERHOOD: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF 
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 52–53 (2019). 
 99. Parrillo v. Italy, 2015-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 249. 
 100. Id. at 293. 
 101. “The legal principle of the primacy of the human being clearly contradicts the 
justification of the destruction of embryos in vitro in the interest of science.” ECHR to Rule 
 on the Status of Embryo, EUR. CTR. FOR L. & JUST., https://eclj.org/eugenics/echr/the-
european-court-on-human-rights-to-rule-on-the-status-of-the-human-embryo (last visited 
Mar. 17, 2021). 
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embryos obtained from assisted reproduction, the court had regard 
to the parties’ freedom of choice. However, the right to donate 
embryos to scientific research is not one of the core rights attracting 
the protection of Article 8 of the Convention, as it does not concern 
a particularly important aspect of the applicant’s existence and 
identity. Consequently, the court considered that the respondent 
State should have afforded a wide margin of appreciation. Once 
again, although the legal reasoning advanced by the Christian 
advocacy groups and by the ECtHR are quite divergent, the 
outcome with regards to the scope of the margin of appreciation is 
similar. The difference is the willingness of the court to apply the 
Convention as a living instrument in accordance with individuals’ 
needs through a careful implementation of the proportionality test. 
However, where the court is unable to find the existence of a 
European consensus and the state’s margin of appreciation 
prevails, the Strasbourg jurisprudence may coincide with Christian 
advocacy groups if they endorse the government’s arguments. 
In the same way, the margin of appreciation has been very 
relevant in cases regarding gender reassignment and the right to 
gender identity. There have been a high number of cases with the 
active participation of ECLJ and ADF International: A.P. , Garçon & 
Nicot v. France,102 X v. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,103 Y.T. 
v. Bulgaria,104 and S.V. v. Italy.105 Both NGOs indicated that this line 
of cases raises fundamental questions regarding definitions in the 
spheres of ethics, psychology, and medical science, and the states 
should enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in striking a balance 
between the competing public and private interests at stake. 
Therefore, how states addressed transgender issues would depend 
on the specific features of each state.106 In contrast, the ECtHR has 
carefully weighed the competing interests in each case and has 
expressly asserted that Article 8 may also impose certain positive 
obligations on the state. These obligations may involve the 
adoption of specific measures, including the provision of an 
 
 102. A.P. v. France, App. Nos. 79885/12, 52471/13 & 52596/13 (Apr. 6, 2017), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-172913. 
 103. X v. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, App. No. 29683/16 (Jan. 17, 2019), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-189096. 
 104. Y.T. v. Bulgaria, App. No. 41701/16 (July 9, 2020), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=001-203493. 
 105. S.V. v. Italy, App. No. 55216/08 (Oct. 11, 2018), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=001-187111. 
 106. See X, ¶ 60. 
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effective and accessible means of protecting the right to respect for 
private life. Such measures may include both the provision of a 
regulatory framework of adjudicatory and enforcement machinery 
protecting individuals’ rights and the implementation, where 
appropriate, of these measures in different contexts.107 For example, 
in X v. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the applicant’s Article 
8 grievances concerned allegations about the lack of regulatory 
framework for legal gender recognition and the requirement that 
such recognition is conditional on complete sex reassignment 
surgery. In A.P. v. France, the court reiterated that this kind of 
application entails essential aspects of an individual’s intimate 
identity, physical integrity, and sexual identity, and making 
recognition of the sexual identity of transgender persons 
conditional on undergoing an operation or treatment entailing 
sterilization against their wishes is a violation of the Convention. 
However, the state parties retained a wide margin of approval in 
deciding whether to impose the condition of a prior psychological 
diagnosis for the identity of transgender persons.108 Similarly, in 
S.V. v. Italy, with regards to the refusal by the authorities to 
authorize a change of forename before the completion of gender 
reassignment surgery, ADF International repeated the same 
arguments as in A.P. v. France, and the Strasbourg Court observed 
that “the rigid nature of the judicial procedure for recognizing the 
gender identity of transgender persons . . . , which [had] placed the 
applicant for an unreasonable time in an anomalous position” that 
was apt to engender feelings of “vulnerability, humiliation[,] and 
anxiety[,]” constituted a violation of Article 8.109 Similarly, in the 
recent case Y.T. v. Bulgaria in July 2020, the ECtHR restated the 
relevance of the vulnerability of the applicant when assessing the 
violation of Article 8. The court identified that the rigidity in the 
domestic courts’ reasoning had placed Y.T. for an unreasonable and 
 
 107. See Hämäläinen v. Finland, 2014-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 369, 390–91. 
 108. A.P. v. France, App. Nos. 79885/12, 52471/13 and 52596/13, ¶¶ 116–28 (Apr. 6, 
2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-172913. 
 109. S.V., App. No. 55216/08, ¶¶ 53, 72; see also Recommendation CM/Rec (2010)5 of the 
Committee of Ministers to Member States on Measures to Combat Discrimination on Grounds of 
Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/ 
result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016805cf40a (last visited Mar. 17, 2021). 
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continuous period in a troubling position, in which he was liable to 
experience feelings of “vulnerability, humiliation[,] and anxiety.”110 
c. The right to life and the right to end life: abortion and euthanasia 
cases. The Strasbourg organs authorize States, within their limited 
margin of appreciation, to determine the starting point of the right 
to life in their domestic legal system.111 In the case of A, B & C v. 
Ireland, the court ruled that there was no European consensus as to 
the scientific and legal definition of the starting point of the life of 
a person.112 As a Grand Chamber case, A, B & C v. Ireland had a high 
number of written observations from pro-life NGOs, and the court 
held that while Article 8 could not be interpreted as conferring a 
right to abortion, its prohibition in Ireland came within the scope of 
the applicants’ right to respect for their physical and psychological 
integrity within their private lives under Article 8.113 The most 
striking difference between the ECtHR and the Christian advocacy 
groups is that while the court relies on the States’ margin of 
appreciation concerning the question of when life begins, as there 
is no European consensus on the scientific and legal definition of 
the beginning of life, ECLJ explicitly criticized the ECtHR’s 
reasoning in A, B & C v. Ireland: 
To speak of a “scientific and legal definition of the beginning of life” 
confuses scientific reality and its judicial representation, the fact 
(the child) and the value (the person). . . . It cannot be claimed that 
it is the state of scientific knowledge (that is to say, embryology 
and foetology) which makes it “impossible to answer the question 
whether the unborn child is a ‘person,’” it is only a matter of moral 
understanding, a choice of values, and not an issue of fact.114 
Here, there are two different approaches: one relies on facts such as 
a possible European consensus on when life begins, and the other 
relies on fundamental principles beyond European consensus. On 
one hand, the ECtHR holds that “[t]he Convention is intended to 
 
 110. Y.T. v. Bulgaria, App. No. 41701/16, ¶ 72 (July 9, 2020), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=001-203898 (editors’ translation). The domestic authorities’ refusal to grant legal 
recognition to Y.T.’s gender reassignment, without giving relevant and sufficient  
reasons thus constituted an unjustified interference with Y.T.’s right to respect for his private 
life. Id. ¶ 74. 
 111. Vo v. France, 2004-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 67, 107–08. 
 112. A v. Ireland, 2010-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 185, 243. 
 113. Id. at 255. 
 114. GRÉGOR PUPPINCK, ABORTION AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 3 
(Eur. Ctr. for L. & Just., 2015), http://media.aclj.org/pdf/FINAL-6.-Abortion-and-the-
European-Court-of-Human-RightsV1.pdf. 
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guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that 
are practical and effective[.]”115 This is the reason why the 
Strasbourg Court has found states to be under a positive obligation 
to secure to their citizens the right to effective respect for their 
physical and psychological integrity, and it has found that  
the prohibition of abortion when sought for reasons of health 
and/or well-being falls within the scope of the right to respect  
for one’s private life.116 On the other hand, for Christian advocacy 
groups, there is a founded philosophical approach to the definition 
of a person: 
[T]he unborn child and the person materially designate the same 
thing, a single and unique being. . . . The distinction between the 
unborn child and the person is fictional, because the notion of the 
person itself becomes fictional from the moment it claims to mean 
something other than tangible reality. This difference between the 
fact (the child) and the notion (person) only exists by choice, in 
order to make space for individual liberty. . . . The human being 
is then a person because of and in proportion to his animation by 
his spirit . . . .117 
This latter argument has also been deployed by the Christian 
groups in cases regarding assisted suicide and euthanasia. For 
example, Gross v. Switzerland is another Grand Chamber judgment 
with a high number of third-party interventions but with no access 
to the submissions written by them.118 Unfortunately, the court did 
not even refer to the content of the written submissions. In Gross v. 
Switzerland, the applicant complained, relying on Article 8 of the 
Convention, that the Swiss authorities, by depriving her of the 
possibility of obtaining a lethal dose of sodium pentobarbital, had 
violated her right to decide by what means and at what point her 
life would end. The court did not address substantial issues but 
decided the case on Article 35 section 3(a) grounds (abuse of the 
right of petition).119 Although the court did not delve into 
substantive considerations, ECLJ’s written submission, available 
 
 115. See Airey v. Ireland, App. No. 6289/73, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 305, 314 (1979); see also  
P. v. Poland, App. No. 57375/08, ¶ 99 (Oct. 30, 2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
114098 (using a similar approach to Airey v. Ireland); A.K. v. Latvia, App. No. 33011/08  
(June 24, 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-145005. 
 116. P., App. No. 57375/08, ¶ 96. 
 117. PUPPINCK, supra note 114, at 4. 
 118. Gross v. Switzerland, 2014-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 463. 
 119. Id. at 477. 
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on the NGO’s internet site, provides substantive points for 
reflection. ELCJ relies on Pretty v. United Kingdom, in which the 
court stated that “Article 2 cannot, without a distortion of language, 
be interpreted as conferring the diametrically opposite right, 
namely a right to die; nor can it create a right to self-determination 
in the sense of conferring on an individual the entitlement to choose 
death rather than life.”120 ECLJ, in its amicus brief, asked whether 
the State should have an obligation to take positive action to 
prevent suicide or whether an assisted suicide falls within the scope 
of private life, and argued the state obligation to prevent suicide is 
conditioned on the autonomy of the person. It is interesting how 
ECLJ frames this dilemma as two conflicting values at stake: 
personal autonomy vs. the principle of heteronomy.121 The 
mentioned Christian NGO understands the principle of 
heteronomy as a set of values, as objective and universal as 
possible, which arise from universal human nature and upon which 
the ECHR has been built. Consequently, the ECtHR should not 
adjudicate cases without taking into consideration these universal 
and heteronomous values. 
d. Foster care and family life. The following cases of Lobben v. 
Norway,122 Wunderlich v. Germany,123 Tlapak v. Germany,124 and 
Wetjen v. Germany125 deal with parental rights and upbringing of 
children, foster care, corporal punishment, and homeschooling. In 
all these cases, the court confronts two potential competing rights: 
the right to have family and the protection of family ties versus the 
 
 120. Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 155, 186. 
 121. “This conception of individual autonomy, seen as a liberation of the individual 
from standards of society that are perceived as heteronomous, poses a danger to social unity, 
as well as to the consistency and effectiveness of the law, including the law pertaining to 
human rights.” Written Observations for Eur. Ctr. for L. & Just. as Third-Party Intervener at 
8, Gross, 2014-IV Eur Ct. H.R. 463 (No. 67810/10), https://eclj.org/pdf/alda-gross-v-
switzerland.pdf. 
 122. Lobben v. Norway, App. No. 37283/13 (Sept. 10, 2019), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-195909. 
 123. Wunderlich v. Germany, App. No. 18925/15 (Jan. 10, 2019), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188994. 
 124. Tlapak v. Germany, App. Nos. 11308/16 & 11344/16 (Mar. 22, 2018), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-181584. 
 125. Wetjen v. Germany, App. Nos. 68125/14 & 72204/14 (Mar. 22, 2018), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-181583. 
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child’s best interests. In Tlapak v. Germany and Wetjen v. Germany,126 
ADF International appears as the only third-party intervener to 
emphasize the importance of upholding family ties. The court 
asserts that Article 8 requires a fair balance between the interests of 
the child and those of the parent and, in striking such a balance, 
particular importance must be attached to the best interests of the 
child.127 The prevalence of the best interest of the child also follows 
in Lobben and Others v. Norway. In this latter case, ADF International 
emphasized that “family was internationally recognised as the 
fundamental group of society and of particular importance to 
children . . . [and] emphasised the duty to maintain contact 
between parents and children and to provide practical assistance to 
families.”128 However, the court reiterates: 
[T]he best interests of the child dictate, on the one hand, that the 
child’s ties with its family must be maintained, except in cases 
where the family has proved particularly unfit, since severing 
those ties means cutting a child off from its roots. It follows that 
family ties may only be severed in very exceptional circumstances 
and that everything must be done to preserve personal relations 
and, if and when appropriate, to “rebuild” the family . . . .129 
In Wunderlich v. Germany,130 ECLJ strongly defends the parents’ 
rights in homeschooling since “family takes precedence on State, 
particularly as regards education and teaching.”131 The parents 
complained to the ECtHR about the violation of their family life 
under Article 8. The court acknowledges the infringement of this 
right but considers that Germany has the right to prohibit 
homeschooling to protect the interest of the child and concludes 
 
 126. In both cases, the applicants were members of the Twelve Tribes Church, a 
religious community where it was alleged various forms of corporal punishment were used 
in the upbringing of children. 
 127. Tlapak, App. Nos. 11308/16 & 11344/16, ¶ 82. 
 128. Lobben v. Norway, App. No. 37283/13, ¶ 192 (Sept. 10, 2019), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-195909. 
 129. Id. ¶ 207. 
 130. Mr. and Mrs. Wunderlich had four children and wished to teach them at home, 
which is forbidden in Germany. The German courts withdrew the custody of their  
children and asked them to hand over the children to a legal guardian so that they could go 
to school. The children repeatedly refused to accompany the guardian who came to  
take them away. Wunderlich v. Germany, App. No. 18925/15, ¶ 14 (Jan. 10, 2019), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188994. 
 131. Written Observations for Eur. Ctr. for L. & Just. as Third-Party Intervener at 1, 
Wunderlich, App. No. 18925/15 [hereinafter Written Observations for ECLJ in Wunderlich], 
http://media.aclj.org/pdf/EN-Observations-ECLJ-Wunderlich-v-Germany.pdf. 
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that the withdrawal from homeschooling was fully necessary and 
proportionate in a democratic society and that there was no 
violation of the right to respect for family life. The ECtHR 
supported the German courts that justified the partial withdrawal 
of parental authority by relying on the risk of the persistent refusal 
of the applicants to send their children to school, stating: 
[T]he children would not only acquire knowledge but also  
learn social skills, such as tolerance or assertiveness, and  
have contact with persons other than their family, in particular 
children of their age. The [German] Court of Appeal further  
held that the applicants’ children were being kept in a  
“symbiotic” family system.132 
The observations about homeschooling submitted by ECLJ are very 
interesting. Considering that homeschooling is quite widespread in 
the United States and supported by ACLJ, which is directly 
connected to ECLJ, the latter reminds the ECtHR that the rights of 
parents are natural rights and are entitled to full respect in their 
freedom of education by the state. According to ECLJ, public or 
state school is in no way a guarantee of political and ideological 
neutrality; “quite the opposite, experience shows that families are 
generally less politicized than the State, and hence constitute a 
natural obstacle to totalitarianism.”133 The ECtHR fears “the 
emergence of parallel societies” based on separate philosophical 
convictions;134 on the contrary, ECLJ contends that not allowing 
homeschooling will result in homogenous society by the state 
without respect for minorities and families. 
 
 132. Wunderlich, App. No. 18925/15, ¶ 49. 
 133. Written Observations for ECLJ in Wunderlich, supra note 131, at 7. 
 134. In Wunderlich, 
The Court further reiterates that it has already examined cases regarding the 
German system of imposing compulsory school attendance while excluding home 
education. It has found it established that the State, in introducing such a system, 
had aimed at ensuring the integration of children into society with a view to 
avoiding the emergence of parallel societies, considerations that were in line with 
the Court’s own case-law on the importance of pluralism for democracy and which 
fell within the Contracting States’ margin of appreciation in setting up and 
interpreting rules for their education systems[.] 
Wunderlich, App. No. 18925/15, ¶ 50. 
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3. Autonomy of religious groups and individual religious freedom 
Church autonomy has been one of the workhorses for Christian 
advocacy groups at the ECtHR, and the Strasbourg Court has been 
very sensitive to their arguments as third-party interveners. 
Indeed, the autonomous existence of religious communities has 
been considered indispensable for pluralism in democratic societies 
because it directly concerns not only the organization of the 
community as such but also the effective enjoyment of the right to 
freedom of religion by all its active members. As the Strasbourg 
Court noted in Martínez v. Spain, if the organizational life of the 
community is not protected by Article 9, all other aspects of the 
individual’s freedom of religion would become vulnerable.135 
Alliance Defending Freedom submitted written observations 
jointly with ECLJ in Travaš v. Croatia,136 and it stood alone as a third 
party in Nagy v. Hungary.137 ECLJ was not accompanied as amicus 
curiae by ADF in Sindicatul “Păstorul cel Bun” v. Romania138 nor in 
Martínez. The Strasbourg Court has outlined that the respect for the 
autonomy principle of religious communities implies, among other 
aspects that cannot be exhausted here, that states, including 
national courts, cannot decide on the question of the religious 
belonging of an individual or group, which is the sole responsibility 
of the authorities of the religious communities. In this point, the 
ECtHR is very much aligned with the arguments submitted by the 
mentioned NGOs. However, problems arise when religious 
autonomy conflicts with the individual beliefs of the member or the 
employee of the religious group (Article 9) or with her or his private 
and family life (Article 8). ADF and ECLJ have jointly argued that 
the “exercise of Church autonomy guaranteed under Article 9 of 
the Convention . . . could not as such be subjected to judicial review 
before the civil courts[.]”139 Moreover, for both advocacy groups, 
the principle of heightened duty of loyalty, recognized in labor law, 
should be applicable in the context of employment by a religious 
community, irrespective of whether such employment was direct 
 
 135. Martínez v. Spain, 2014-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 449, 482–83. 
 136. Travaš v. Croatia, App. No. 75581/13 (Oct. 4, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=001-166942. 
 137. Nagy v. Hungary, App. No. 56665/09 (Sept. 14, 2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=001-177070. 
 138. Sindicatul “Păstorul cel Bun” v. Romania, 2013-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 41. 
 139. Travaš, App. No. 75581/13, ¶ 73. 
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or indirect through the state employment system.140 Despite the 
ECtHR’s tendency to strongly protect organizational autonomy, a 
new trend seems to be emerging for balancing religious autonomy 
with the right to private life (Article 8)—a more contextual and 
sensitive approach to cases involving conflicting rights.141 
In cases regarding the manifestation of religious freedom 
through personal or static symbols, the two Christian NGOs 
provided interesting arguments in their written submissions on 
two landmark cases, Lautsi v. Italy142 and Eweida v. United 
Kingdom.143 Following U.S. case law in Lautsi v. Italy, ADF, on behalf 
of thirty-two members of European Parliament, outlined the fact 
that a cross, certainly a Christian symbol, by its placement in the 
public sphere does not necessarily promote a Christian message 
when some religious symbols have been secularized.144 ADF 
insisted “that the ‘separation of church and state’ does not require 
the eradication of all public symbols in the public realm” but rather 
their “accommodation.”145 Similarly, ECLJ, jointly with ADF, drew 
the court’s attention to the concept of reasonable accommodation 
of religious beliefs and practices, insofar as that accommodation 
did not cause “undue hardship” to the employer.146 American case 
law played an important role in the legal reasoning in the ECtHR’s 
assessment of both cases in their third-party interventions by the 
Christian advocacy groups. 
It is also remarkable to note that ADF International has 
intervened to extend the scope of freedom of religion in cases 
regarding members of minority groups, particularly Jehovah’s 
Witnesses who refuse to perform their military service. In 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. ¶ 88. 
 142. Lautsi v. Italy, 2011-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 61. 
 143. Eweida v. United Kingdom, 2013-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 215. 
 144. Written Observations for All. Def. Fund on Behalf of 32 Members of European 
Parliament as Third-Party Interveners at 2–3, Lautsi, 2011-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 61 (No. 30814/06), 
http://1ztp833emcflef7tm24jjqbe-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/ 
12/Lautsi-and-Others-v.-Italy_ADF-Brief4.pdf. 
 145. Id. at 2 (quoting Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010)). 
 146. Written Observations for All. Def. Fund et al. as Third-Party Interveners at 9–10, 
Eweida, 2013-I Eur Ct. H.R. 215 (Nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 & 36516/10) (citing Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and subsequent case law). 
1359 Christian Faith-Based Organizations 
 1359 
Mammadov v. Azerbaijan147 and in Papavasilakis v. Greece,148 ADF 
acknowledged the difficulty in practice for domestic courts to 
assess whether a claim relating to a belief was genuine and 
sincere.149 For that reason, ADF encouraged the court to follow the 
framework for evaluating such claims and noted that the question 
was whether an individual opposed to the obligation to perform 
military service was placed “in a serious conflict between that 
obligation[,] . . . his or her genuinely and deeply held religious” 
beliefs, and being “forced to act against the dictates of his or her 
conscience.”150 In these cases, the NGO’s intervention was just a 
reminder to the ECtHR of previous case law.151 
4. Freedom of expression 
Four cases regarding the freedom of expression, Religious 
Community of Jehovah’s Witnesses v. Azerbaijan,152 Annen v. 
Germany,153 Alekhina v. Russia,154 and E.S. v. Austria,155 reveal the 
relevance of freedom of speech for ADF and ECLJ. The latter 
advocated for abolishing blasphemy as a criminal charge in E.S. v 
Austria,156 and in Religious Community of Jehovah’s Witnesses, ADF 
 
 147. Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, App. No. 14604/08 (Oct. 17, 2019), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-197066. 
 148. Papavasilakis v. Greece, App. No. 66899/14 (Sept. 15, 2016), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-166850. 
 149. Id. ¶ 49. 
 150. Id.; see Mammadov, App. No. 14604/08, ¶ 74 (using similar language). 
 151. Interestingly, the court extended the scope of Article 9 of the Convention to 
conscientious objections to compulsory military service in Bayatyan v. Armenia, 2011-IV Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 1, 34, by applying its living instrument doctrine to interpret Article 9 in accordance 
with the current standard recognizing conscientious objection. In this case, the President 
gave leave to intervene in the written procedure to the European Association of Jehovah’s 
Christian Witnesses. Id. at 8. 
 152. Religious Cmty. of Jehovah’s Witnesses v. Azerbaijan, App. No. 52884/09 (Feb. 20, 
2020), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-201087. ADF International intervened to 
underscore the importance of religious freedom and freedom of expression as well as the 
dangerous precedent it sets when the government is allowed to blacklist certain religious 
texts. See id. ¶ 23 
 153. Annen v. Germany, App. No. 3690/10 (Nov. 26, 2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=001-158880. 
 154. Alekhina v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 38004/12 (July 17, 2018), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre?i=001-184666 (involving the Russian feminist punk band, 
Pussy Riot). 
 155. E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12 (Oct. 25, 2018), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=001-187188. 
 156. Id. ¶ 38. 
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encouraged the court to not restrict the dissemination of religious 
publications unless done “in response to a particular pressing social 
need.”157 To safeguard tolerance, broadmindedness, and pluralism, 
freedom of expression could be hampered only exceptionally.158 
The line of argumentation goes in hand with the ECtHR’s general 
principles on Article 10. The Christian advocacy groups endorse 
religious minorities’ claims, such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses’s 
application, because it involves litigation to protect the 
manifestation of religion, which is part of these NGOs’ main goals. 
5. Religion-based refugee claims 
According to the UN guidelines’ general principles on religion-
based refugee claims, religion should be broadly interpreted “to 
encompass freedom of thought, conscience or belief[,]”159 and 
membership in a persecuted group with a reasonable fear of 
persecution should be enough for asylum adjudication.160 There are 
two controversial questions addressed by the ECtHR and the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) that have driven the 
attention of ECLJ and ADF. The first is regarding the definition of 
persecution and which kind of interference with the right to 
religious freedom would constitute persecution. The second 
regards the extent to which an asylum seeker is expected to conceal 
or restrain their religion in their country of origin to avoid 
persecution. The participation of ECLJ and ADF, as NGOs 
defending religious freedom for Christians worldwide, deserves 
attention in the following cases: A. v. Switzerland,161 F.G. v. Sweden, 
 
 157. Religious Cmty. of Jehovah’s Witnesses, App. No. 52884/09, ¶ 23. 
 158. Annen, App. No. 3690/10, ¶ 48 (summarizing ADF’s reasoning that “controversial 
opinions expressed in the course of an intense political debate of public interest  
[are] protected under Article 10, even if formulated in strong, offensive, shocking or 
disturbing language[,]” and that any restrictions on such speech must be justified by 
“significant reasons”). 
 159. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEE, GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION: 
RELIGION-BASED REFUGEE CLAIMS UNDER ARTICLE 1A(2) OF THE 1951 CONVENTION AND/OR 
THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 3 (2004), 
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/publications/legal/40d8427a4/guidelines-international-
protection-6-religion-based-refugee-claims-under.html. 
 160. See Rosita Šorytė, Religious Persecution, Refugees, and Right of Asylum: The Case of  
The Church of Almighty God, 2 J. CESNUR 78, 78–99 (2018). 
 161. A. v. Switzerland, App. No. 60342/16 (Dec. 19, 2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=001-179573. 
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162 and A.A. v. Switzerland.163 In A. v. Switzerland, the ECtHR 
endorsed an expulsion of a convert in Iran and accepted the 
argument of the Swiss government according to which the 
Christians “who practised their faith discreetly, did not face a real 
risk of ill-treatment upon return.”164 However, one year earlier, in 
F.G. v. Sweden, the Grand Chamber of the Court had refused to 
deport a converted Iranian to his country, and the court explained 
that it could not “accept the respondent State’s assumption that the 
applicant would not be persecuted in Iran because he could engage 
in a low-profile, discreet or even secret practice of his religious 
beliefs.”165 ECLJ and ADF submitted legally grounded third-party 
observations in F.G. v. Sweden in which they reminded the court 
that “in the light of the CJEU’s judgment in Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland v. Y and Z . . . , the applicant could not be expected to 
conceal his religion to avoid persecution covered by Article 3 of the 
Convention.”166 The same line of argumentation was presented by 
ADF International in A.A. v. Switzerland, and the ECtHR considered 
that the return to Afghanistan of an asylum seeker who had 
converted to Christianity would be contrary to the European 
Convention because after returning to Afghanistan, A.A. could not 
be expected to “modify his social behavior to confine his faith to the 
strictly private domain” to the point of even hiding his baptism.167 
CONCLUSION 
The research above has revealed the strategies of the three main 
Christian advocacy NGOs as third-party interveners before the 
ECtHR: (1) whether their written submissions result in a broad 
impact in Strasbourg’s legal reasoning, (2) whether they aimed to 
legitimize their own organizations and signal to their members 
about the relevance of their role to inform and assist the court, or 
(3) whether their participation aims to influence public policies on 
specific matters in European states by raising awareness of the 
 
 162. F.G. v. Sweden, App. No. 43611/11 (Mar. 23, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=001-161829. 
 163. A.A. v. Switzerland, App. No. 32218/17 (Nov. 5, 2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=001-197217. 
 164. A., App. No. 60342/16, ¶ 44. 
 165. F.G., App. No. 43611/11, ¶ 6. 
 166. Id. ¶ 108. 
 167. A.A. v. Switzerland, App. No. 32218/17, ¶ 55 (Nov. 5, 2019), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-197217 (author’s translation). 
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relevance of highly contested topics such as abortion, same-sex 
marriage, procreation techniques, assisted suicide, etc.  
The best third-party intervention assists the court by providing 
legal materials and helping in interpreting and applying the rights 
set out in the Convention. However, as the third-party procedure 
stands, it is difficult to know how effective their interventions have 
been: the written submissions are not public, and the court only 
refers partially to the content of the submissions. What should be 
self-evident from this analysis is that through their amicus 
participation, ECLJ, ADF or ADF International, and MPVI have 
sought to assist the court in a partisan way (the Modern Amicus, in 
Mohan’s typology)168 to influence the outcome of the ECtHR when 
adjudicating Convention rights that touch fundamental principles 
of these NGOs: religious freedom, the sanctity of life, marriage and 
family, and Christianity. Nevertheless, these third parties have also 
assisted (as Mohan’s Intervening Good Samaritan) on comparative 
law (Lautsi v. Italy), on the context and circumstances of the facts of 
the case (F.G. v. Sweden), and in providing information to the court 
about the court’s own precedents for the interpretation of rights 
(Gross v. Switzerland).  
The three advocacy groups have taken “proactive” litigation to 
get as much impact as possible in matters broadening the scope of 
freedom of religion for individuals (conscientious objections and 
religious accommodation) and groups (autonomy of religious 
groups). Even when advancing their own interests on these 
matters, above all, they have had an impact on the court’s 
adjudicative task because their submissions have reinforced the 
court’s legal assessments. 
However, on sensitive ethical issues such as family life and 
private life, their interventions can be described as “reactive” 
litigation as part of their conservative agenda because they 
advocate for maintaining the rights that were articulated by the 
Convention’s drafters. As a result, they have challenged the 
evolutive interpretation of the “progressive” articles of ECHR 
linked to personal autonomy, the right to self-determination, and 
the principle of the child’s best interests.  
Finally, the present research also shows the contrasting 
approaches from the ECtHR and these repeat-Christian players 
before the court in claims of ultimate validity, grounded in 
 
 168. Mohan, supra note 30, at 371. 
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ontological foundations, such as the definition of a person, the self-
contained authoritative philosophy of the Convention, and the 
existence of parallel sovereignty spheres like churches and families. 
In these particular matters, what can be witnessed is a struggle in 
which the interventions of the traditional friend of the court, amicus 
curiae, as described in Section II.B, could slowly turn into an 
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APPENDIX: CASE TABLE 










Art. 8 Violation of Art. 8 
2 A.P., Garçon & 
Nicot v. France 
ADF International Art. 8 No violation of 
Art. 8 for two 
applicants 
Violation of 
Article 8 for one 
applicant 




for Law and Justice 
Art. 8 No violation of 
Art. 8 





Art. 8 No violation of 
Art. 8 





Art. 8 No violation of 
Art. 8 
 
6 Y.T. v. Bulgaria ADF International Art. 8 Violation of Art. 8 







Art. 8 Violation of Art. 8 
8 S. V. v. Italy Alliance Defending 
Freedom 
Art. 8 Violation of Art. 8 




Art. 8 No violation of 
Art. 8 




for Law and Justice 
Art. 8 No violation of 
Art. 8 
11 S.H. v. Austria 
 
European Centre 
for Law and Justice 
Art. 8 No violation of 
Art. 8 
12 Orlandi v. Italy Alliance Defending 
Freedom 
European Centre 
for Law and Justice 
Art. 8 Violation of Art. 8 
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13 Parillo v. Italy European Centre 
for Law and Justice 
Movimento per la 
Vita 
Art. 8 No violation of 
Art. 8 
14 A.K. v. Latvia 
(G.C) 
European Centre 
for Law and Justice 
Art. 8 Violation of Art. 8 
15 Martínez v. 
Spain (G.C) 
European Centre 
for Law and Justice 
Art. 8 No violation of 
Art. 8 
16 Cassar v. Malta European Centre 
for Law and Justice 
Art. 8 Strike the 
application out of 
list of cases 
17 A, B & C v. 
Ireland 
European Centre 
for Law and Justice 
Art. 8 No violation of 
Art.8 for two 
applicants 
Violation of Art. 8 
for the third 
applicant 
18 Costa & Pavan 
v. Italy 
European Centre 
for Law and Justice 
Movimento per la 
Vita 
Art. 8 Violation of Art. 8 











Abuse of the right 
of petition 





for Law and Justice 
Art. 14 
Art. 8 
Violation of Art. 
14, in conjunction 
with  




No violation of 
Art. 14, in 
conjunction with 
Article 8 (married 
couple) 
 
21 P. & S. v. Poland European Centre 
for Law and Justice 
Art. 8 
Art. 3 
Violation of Art. 8 
Violation of Art. 3 
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22 A.A. v. 
Switzerland 
ADF International Art. 3 Violation of Art. 3 
23 A. v. 
Switzerland 
ADF International Art. 2 
and  
Art. 3 
No violation of 
Art. 2 and Art. 3 
24 F. G. v. Sweden Alliance Defending 
Freedom 
European Centre 
for Law and Justice 
Art. 2 
Art. 3 
No violation of 
Art. 2 
Violation of Art. 3 
25 O’Keeffe v. 
Ireland 
European Centre 
for Law and Justice 
Art. 3 Violation of Art. 3 
26 M. B. v. Turkey European Centre 
for Law and Justice 
Art. 3 Violation of Art. 3 
27 W.K & M.F. v. 
Sweden 
European Centre 
for Law and Justice 
Art. 3  
28 A.R.M. v. Bosnia 
& Herzegovina 
European Centre 
for Law and Justice 
Art. 3 Application 
inadmissible 
29 R.B.G. v. Turkey European Centre 
for Law and Justice 
Art. 3 Not found in 
HUDOC 






Violation of Art. 3 
Violation of Art. 
10 






for Law and Justice 










Art. 10 Violation of Art. 
10 
33 E.S. v. Austria European Centre 
for Law and Justice 
Art. 10 No violation of 
Art. 10 





Art. 9 Violation of Art. 9 
35 Eweida v. 
United Kingdom 
European Centre 
for Law and Justice 
Alliance Defending 
Freedom 
Art. 9 Violation of Art. 9 
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Art. 9 Violation of Art. 9 
 




















Bun” v. Romania 
European Centre 
for Law and Justice 
Art. 11 No violation of 
Art. 11 





Art. 2 of 
Protocol 
4 
Violation of Art. 2 
of Protovol No. 4 
41 Herrmann v. 
Germany 
European Centre 
for Law and Justice 
Art. 1 of 
Protocol 
No. 1 
Violation of Art. 1 
42 Lautsi v. Italy 
(G.C) 
European Centre 
for Law and Justice 
P 1- 2 No violation of  
P 1 – 2 
43 B.B contra la 
Pologne 
European Centre 
for Law and Justice 




for Law and Justice 
  
 
Sources: HUDOC Database (https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/), European 
Center for Law & Justice (https://eclj.org/), ADF International 
(https://adfinternational.org/), and Alliance Defending Freedom 
(https://adflegal.org/). 
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